Basic Themes For Regulatory Takings Litigation by Byrne, J. Peter
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
1999 
Basic Themes For Regulatory Takings Litigation 
J. Peter Byrne 
Georgetown University Law Center, byrne@law.georgetown.edu 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1570 
 
J. Peter Byrne, Basic Themes For Regulatory Takings Litigation, 29 Envtl. L. 811 (1999) 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons 
TAKINGS LAW SYMPOSIUM
BASIC THEMES FOR REGULATORY TAKINGS LITIGATION
BY
J. PETER BYRNE*
There is probably no area of law that is as fraught with confusion and incon-
sistencies as the regulatory takings doctrine. In this Article, Professor Byrne
summarizes arguments, called "litigation themes," that can be made to help
circumnavigate the many pitfalls and quagmires that await takings liti-
gators as a result of this confusion. The Article argues that the Fifth Amend-
ment's Takings Clause was never meant to apply to the regulation of property,
but only to physical or legal appropriations. Professor Byrne suggests that the
Due Process Clauses or the Equal Protection Clause are equally capable of
resolving the conflicts that result from the regulation of property that have
traditionally been examined under the Takings Clause. The litigation themes
discussed in this Article are a means to shift regulatory takings arguments
away from the Takings Clause toward the Due Process Clauses or the Equal
Protection Clause.
I. INTRODUCTION
In my view, the Takings Clause' ought not apply to regulations of
resource use at all, but only to physical or legal appropriations. 2 Serious
unfairness in the administration of land use and environmental laws may
raise constitutional concerns that can and should be addressed under the
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, J.D. 1979,
University of Virginia; M.A 1976, Northwestern University; B.A. 1973, Northwestern
University.
1 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation").
.2 See J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments For the Abolition of the Regulatory Takings Doc-
trine, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89 (1995).
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Equal Protection Clause 3 or substantive due process analysis.4 Of course,
no litigator would directly advocate such a position while defending a par-
ticular land use regulation. But many of the arguments against any regula-
tory takings doctrine also support specific claims for a narrow reading of
applicability of the doctrine to particular facts.
Thematic coherence is important in any litigation, but it is essential in
regulatory takings litigation, where the law to be applied lacks doctrinal
clarity and consistency. Because the Takings Clause contains no clear test
or determinate prohibition directed at regulations, argument about its ap-
plication must involve rhetorical appropriation of broad constitutional
standards and jurisprudential meanings. Generally, property rights advo-
cates have had the better of struggles to link the reach of the Takings
Clause to attractive norms, invoking images of lonely, weak individuals
seeking liberty and enjoyment of the fruits of their honest labor.5 Too
often government lawyers woodenly defend regulations either as not hurt-
ing an owner too much or as not quite fitting within a doctrinal category.
In fact, a challenged regulation will often appropriately serve important
public purposes that need to be intelligently explained to the court. That is
the core of any constitutional defense. In close or mixed cases, however,
the litigation themes outlined in this Article may help persuade a doubtful
judge that the government deserves the benefit of the doubt.
Moreover, consciousness of these themes will help provide coher-
ence to the legal positions taken by a government entity that repeatedly
defends against regulatory takings claims. The defense of takings claims
should be pursued, to the extent possible, with a view toward narrowing
the scope of the regulatory takings doctrine. Consistent with the specific
litigation goals of a particular case, advocates should consistently make
arguments that tend to move the law in the direction of this goal whenever
3 U.S. CONST. amend. XJV ("nor shall any state... deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the law").
4 See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law .... ."); id. amend XIV ("nor shall any State ... deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"). My sense is that the unfair-
ness that bothered the Supreme Court in last term's decision in City of Monterey v. Del
Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 119 S. Ct. 1624 (1999) (describing shifting and increasingly
difficult standards), would best be resolved by finding a denial of procedural due process.
Also, the most intuitively appealing argument for David Lucas in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), was that he was forbidden to build on his lot, even
though his neighbors on both sides had already built. Id. at 1031 (citing RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) TORTS § 827 cmt. g (1977) as support for the proposition that "[t]he fact that a particu-
lar use has long been engaged in by similarly situated owners ordinarily imports a lack of
any common-law prohibition (though changed circumstances or new knowledge may make
what was previously permissible no longer so)"). This argument also raises interesting is-
sues under the Equal Protection Clause.
5 Conservative public interest law firms choose plaintiffs who are sympathetic individu-
als, such as Bernadine Suitum, an elderly woman whose desire to build a retirement home
was frustrated by the water protection rules of the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency. Mrs.
Suitum attended argument in her case in the Supreme Court, sitting in the front row in a
wheel chair. See Richard Lazarus, Litigating Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency in
the Supreme Court, 12 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 179, 189-90 (1997).
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possible. On the other hand, arguments that represent a diversion from the
ultimate goal of narrowing the scope of the regulatory takings doctrine-
or that actually detract from achieving this goal-should be avoided if
possible.
This brief Article summarizes arguments that can be made in regula-
tory takings cases to advocate a narrow reading of the Takings Clause.
Fortunately, many of this Article's arguments may appeal to conservative
judges who might instinctively be sympathetic to strong property rights
positions. The arguments highlight jurisprudential tensions between ac-
tivist interpretations of the Takings Clause and traditional themes of con-
servative constitutional interpretation. In other words, the arguments
point out the contradiction between expansive interpretations of the Tak-
ings Clause and traditional notions of judicial restraint and states' rights.
II. LITIGATION THEMES
A. The Narrow Language of the Takings Clause
The language of the Takings Clause shows that the clause applies only
to physical appropriations and their functional equivalents; it does not
support the view that the clause applies to regulations that limit permissi-
ble uses and diminish the value of property. The key word is "take." A
taking is an actual physical appropriation. Simple regulation does not take.
To borrow Professor Treanor's helpful metaphor, if a parent tells her
daughter that she cannot play with her ball in the house, she has lost
something of value, i.e., the right to play with the ball in the house. The
parent has regulated what her daughter can do with the ball, but she has
not "taken" it. The daughter is still free to play with it outside. The parent
only "takes" her daughter's ball when she physically seizes it.6
The point to be made in takings litigation is that the regulatory reach
of the clause should be narrowly construed because it exceeds the scope
of the Constitution's language. The regulatory takings doctrine is a crea-
tive judicial metaphor that treats a regulation as if it were a seizure. To
maintain a vital link to the constitutional text, the application of the doc-
trine to regulations should be reserved for severe constraints on an
owner's use of a resource that approach or resemble those that would
result from a physical deprivation.
B. The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause
Legal scholars of all shades of political opinion recognize that the
available evidence about the original understanding of the Takings Clause
shows that the clause was intended to apply only to direct physical appro-
6 WILLIAM MICHAEL TREANOR, THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE 3-4
(Environmental Policy Project ed., 1998). To borrow another example, used by Jo Evans (a
Colorado environmentalist), if I reach out and remove your pen from your pocket, I have
"taken" it. If, on the other hand, I instruct you not to use your pen to write on the walls, or to
poke your neighbor, I have regulated your use of your pen, but I have not "taken" it.
1999]
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priations.7 The leading recent scholarship on this point includes the works
of Professors John F. Hart and William Michael Treanor.8 Noted conserva-
tives, including former Solicitor General Charles Fried and former judge
Robert Bork, have explicitly acknowledged that the broad regulatory tak-
ings argument has no foundation in the original understanding of the Tak-
ings Clause. 9
Arguments for a reading of the Takings Clause that conforms to the
original understanding represent a thoroughly conservative approach to
constitutional interpretation. Thus, the original understanding argument is
not only firmly rooted in constitutional history, it also contradicts the con-
ventional view that a broad reading of the Takings Clause represents a
"conservative" position. Reference to the strong evidence about the origi-
nal understanding of the Takings Clause should, at a minimum, be helpful
in persuading judges to avoid further expansion of the regulatory takings
doctrine. 10
C. Regulatory Takings and the Tradition of Judicial Restraint
A related point is that a narrow reading of the Takings Clause is sup-
ported by the courts' traditional reluctance to avoid intervening in the pol-
icy judgments of democratically elected officials." Each time a
nonelected federal court finds a regulatory taking, for example, it is
trumping a determination by a branch of government that directly or indi-
rectly reflects the popular will. Under our system of government, which is
ultimately founded upon the consent of the people, such interference with
political judgments is intended to be reserved for special and important
circumstances. A broad conception of regulatory takings contradicts this
tradition and threatens to bring the judiciary into contempt.' 2
D. Regulatory Takings and Federalism
A key feature of the United States's political system is our federal
structure, which helps ensure decentralized government that is responsive
7 The apparent exceptions to this proposition tend to rely on unnaturally broad claims
about what the Fifth Amendment means by "property." See RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRI-
VATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 100-04 (1985). These exceptions are not
supported by either contemporary legal practice or the early judicial interpretations of state
and federal takings clauses.
8 See John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and its Significance for Modern Takings
Doctrine, 109 HARv. L. REV. 1252 (1996); William Michael Treanor, The Original Understand-
ing of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995).
9 ROBERT BORE, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POULTICAL SEDUCTION OF LAW (1990);
Charles Fried, Protecting Property-Law and Politics, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 44 (1990).
10 Cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) ("The Court is most vulnerable and
comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little
or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution.").
11 See J. Peter Byrne, Regulatory Takings and Judicial Supremacy, ALA. L. REV. (forth-
coming 1999).
12 Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 996, 1000 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(condemning activism of an "Imperial Judiciary" that makes decisions on the basis of "philo-
sophical predilection and moral intuition").
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to diverse needs in different parts of the country, increases opportunities
for public participation in government decision making, and allows for in-
novation and experimentation.' 3 Property law, dealing with the scope and
nature of ownership, is essentially state law. 14 Also, land use decision
making has long been recognized as a core function of state and local
governments in our system of federalism. 15
The Takings Clause has traditionally been read to take account of the
values of federalism. In particular, the Supreme Court has recognized that
while determining the definition of "taking" is a question of federal law,
underlying property interests "are defined by existing rules or understand-
ings that stem from an independent source such as state law." 16 An expan-
sive notion of regulatory takings, on the other hand, tends to federalize the
property issue by imposing a stricter, more uniform national standard
upon the regulation of property, and by constraining local authorities from
meeting the needs of local communities.
E. Fiscal Impacts of Takings Awards
A number of rather dramatic takings awards have already been en-
tered against state and local governments in takings litigation.' 7 Even
when local governments successfully defend against takings lawsuits, the
mere cost of litigating these claims can be staggering to local govern-
ments. Large compensation awards and litigation costs for regulatory tak-
ings cases can have serious adverse effects on government finances,
particularly at the local level.
Efforts to expand the regulatory takings doctrine threaten to impose
even larger fiscal burdens on local governments. The problem is com-
pounded by the fact that the actual fiscal impacts of incremental change in
the concept of regulatory takings would be hard to predict or control.
These consequences are exacerbated by the Supreme Court's ruling that
property owners may always sue for damages, even when government is
prepared to withdraw regulations found to effect a taking.' 8 The judiciary
cannot responsibly ignore the potential consequences of their decisions
on the fiscal health of states and, in particular, local governments. This
argument was invoked by Justice Kennedy in his separate opinion re-
jecting the application of the Takings Clause to a statute imposing retroac-
tive health care liability on a company: "The plurality opinion would throw
one of the most difficult and litigated areas of law into confusion, subject-
13 See generally Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (describing values served by
federalism).
14 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
15 Id.
16 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984).
17 See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 119 S. Ct. 1624, 1634
(1999) (upholding award of $1,450,000 for plaintiff developer).




ing States and municipalities to the potential of new and unforeseen
claims in vast amounts."19
The Court's blithe willingness to subject state and local governments
to monetary claims for regulatory takings seems in tension with the rap-
idly developing case law under the Eleventh Amendment 2° prohibiting
suits for damages against states without their consent.21 The core ration-
ale in these cases seems to be the incongruity of the Supreme Court's
notion of federalism with the power of the federal government to subject
the state to suits by citizens for money damages. As the Court said re-
cently, "[pirivate suits against non-consenting States-especially suits for
money damages-may threaten the financial integrity of the States."22 In
the Court's view, allowance of such suits must be balanced against other
pressing public needs, and the balance should be struck by the state's
political process.23 Regulatory takings actions brought against state gov-
ernments seem to offend this principle more than do the claims at issue in
the recent Eleventh Amendment cases.
F. Substantive Due Process Redux
The recent rise of an expansive view of regulatory takings unmistaka-
bly represents the revival of the doctrine of substantive due process under
a different guise.24 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the
Supreme Court routinely struck down economic regulations on the ground
that they violated the Due Process Clause. 25 It has been nearly sixty years,
however, since the Court has closely reviewed economic regulations
under the substantive due process doctrine.26
Under the banner of the Takings Clause, some courts are now engag-
ing in the same type of close scrutiny of the wisdom or fairness of eco-
nomic regulations once conducted, but since abandoned, in the
19 Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 542 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
20 U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be con-
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State .... ").
21 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999) (holding that Congress could not sub-
ject state to suit in state court without its consent); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999) (holding that sovereign immunity
was not validly abrogated by Trademark Remedy Clarification Act nor voluntarily waived by
state's activities in interstate commerce); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.
v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999) (holding that the Commerce Clause, the Patent
Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment did not authorize Congress's attempt to abrogate
sovereign immunity in the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act).
22 Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2264.
23 Id. at 2264-65.
24 See Byrne, supra note 11.
25 See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 556-62 (1923) (minimum wages);
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 14-19 (1915) (labor organization); Adair v. United States, 208
U.S. 161, 174-75 (1908) (labor organization); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 58-61 (1905)
(bakers' hours).
26 See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 397-400 (1937) (overruling Adkins).
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substantive due process context.27 Again, concurring in Eastern Enter-
prises v. Apfel, Justice Kennedy complained that "[tlhe imprecision of our
regulatory takings doctrine does open the door to normative considera-
tions about the wisdom of government decisions."
28
The fall of the substantive due process doctrine is typically ascribed
to the realization that democratically elected officials have the constitu-
tional authority to adjust the benefits and burdens of economic life even
when such decisions cause losses to owners of property. If that realization
was well founded in the due process context, it is difficult to see why the
same conclusion should not be reached in the takings context.29 More-
over, it is plainly illogical, indeed disingenuous, for the outcome of a con-
stitutional challenge based on the same fundamental theory to vary
depending upon the label attached to the claim. The similarities between
the modern regulatory takings doctrine and the discredited doctrine of
substantive due process should be helpful in persuading judges to adopt
an appropriately narrow reading of the Takings Clause.
G. Property Norms Necessarily Change
Regulatory takings claims sometimes seem to rest on the premise that
the adoption of new laws and regulations that affect property rights is an
inherently unfair effort to change the rules in midstream. In fact, however,
the definition and scope of property rights have constantly undergone
change in this country as a result of court rulings, administrative actions,
and legislation. A regulatory takings doctrine that tends to freeze property
norms would not only be unprecedented, but would also impose substan-
tial social, economic, and environmental costs by impeding the law's ca-
pacity to adapt to new conditions and values.
Many scholars have emphasized that American property law has con-
stantly undergone change.30 Professor Joseph Sax noted recently that
[i]n eighteenth century America, the states abolished feudal tenures, abrogated
primogenitures and entails, ended imprisonment for debt, and significantly re-
duced rights of alienation, as well as dower and curtsy. In the arid west, land-
owners' riparian rights were simply abolished because they were unsuited to
27 An interesting example is Judge Smith's latest decision in Florida Rock Industries,
Inc. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 21 (1999). In finding a taking in the denial of a permit to
dredge wetlands for mining, Judge Smith held that wetlands protection is not encompassed
within the police power and that destroying wetlands poses no health or safety risk. Id. at
28-31. It is striking how similar this is to the holding of the Supreme Court in Lochner that a
maximum working hours law for bakers does not advance the public health or safety and is
not within the police power. 198 U.S. at 56-58. Both cases are replete with statements that
the court will not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature. See, e.g., id. at 57; Flor-
ida Rock Industries, 45 Fed. Cl. at 40.
28 524 U.S. 498, 545 (1998) (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
29 Cf. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 405-08 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (comparing
modem expansion of regulatory takings doctrine with substantive due process).
30 See, e.g., Eric T. Freyfogle, Ethics, Community, and Private Land, 23 EcOLOGY L.Q.
631, 632-38 (1996); Eric T. Freyfogle, The Owning and Taking of Sensitive Lands, 43 UCLA
L. REV. 77, 77-79 (1995); Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and Economy of Nature: Under-
standing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1448 (1993).
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the physical conditions of the area. As the status of women changed, laws abol-
ished husbands' property rights in their wives' estates.31
There is substantial reason to conclude that property norms are ap-
propriately undergoing substantial change in twentieth century America.
Most importantly, the population of the United States has exploded over
the last century, increasing the potential for conflict between different
property owners and the capacity for individual property owners to de-
grade more limited common resources. Changing values and increased sci-
entific understanding have concomitantly changed our attitudes about
appropriate land uses. For example, wetlands were once viewed as waste-
lands to be filled at the quickest opportunity, but now society strives to
stop their destruction in order to prevent flooding, maintain water quality,
and conserve biological diversity.3 2 Because modem statutes tend to deal
with resource problems by enacting regulatory structures rather than by
amending the common law, the fact that a state is changing its property
norms when it restricts how a resource may be used is sometimes
obscured.
H. Regulatory Takings and Skewed Government Decision Making
A central function of government is to mediate between competing
interests, such as between a property owner and the community, or be-
tween different individuals or groups of individuals. The risk of takings
liability tends to skew government decision making in favor of those in a
position to assert takings claims, at the expense of the community as a
whole.3 3 While there are political costs to most decisions that politicians
make, the risk of government takings liability and the resulting budget im-
pacts exert an especially direct and powerful effect on government deci-
sion makers. For example, rejecting an application to develop wetlands
may give rise to a takings claim, but granting such an application creates
little, if any, risk of government financial liability. Even if the risk of tak-
ings liability is small, the potentially large size of any judgments, along
with the costs of litigating takings claims, can significantly skew govern-
ment decision making.
This, of course, is the goal of advocates of an expansive takings doc-
trine-to deter government regulation of resource use through the threat
of constitutional liability. Many view the effect as benign, arguing that gov-
ernment will make better decisions if it must take into account the costs
borne by the property owners from new regulation.3A4 The briefest reflec-
31 Sax, supra note 30, at 1448 (footnotes omitted).
32 ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY
974-75 (2d ed. 1996).
33 See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 340-41 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Cautious local officials and land-use planners
may avoid taking any action that might later be challenged and thus give rise to a damages
action. Much important regulation will never be enacted, even perhaps in the health and
safety area." (footnote omitted)).
34 See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 7.
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tion shows this view to be nonsense. Since government cannot directly
capture the increased value of resources that accrues as a result of benign
regulation, it will tend to give more weight to the costs of reimbursing
landowners for the effects of the regulations. Costs that must be met from
the Treasury will loom larger in decision making than even greater bene-
fits that remain widely distributed across the polity.
III. CONCLUSION
Expansive judicial interpretation of the Takings Clause remains at
odds with fundamental traditions of constitutional interpretation and is
without basis in the text, purpose, or early interpretations of the clause.
An expansive interpretation and application of the Takings Clause also im-
poses large liabilities on state and local governments, displacing their
traditional roles in formulating land use policy and developing property
law. To be effective, defense of regulation against takings claims should
include arguments and rhetorical references that urge courts to adopt a
narrow interpretation that is consistent with the original understanding
and purpose of the Takings Clause.
1999]
